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Abstract 
The majority of medium-to-large international organizations have adopted enterprise resource planning 
systems (ERPs) of which SAP R/3 is the current market leader. This paper proposes a framework for the 
separation of duties in SAP R/3. Separation of duties is viewed as a critical component of an 
organization’s internal control structure aimed primarily at reducing opportunities for fraudulent 
activities. R/3 assigns profiles consisting of authorizations to users. Accordingly, R/3 facilitates the 
implementation of “role-based access control”, where these profiles may be designed consistent with 
organizational roles and assigned to users performing these roles. This paper proposes a framework for 
adequate separation of duties using a role-based approach in the financial accounting (FI) module of the 
R/3 system. Case studies were undertaken to refine the framework and to explore its application in a 
practical environment. This empirical research provided support for the adequacy of the proposed 
framework.
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1 Background
This paper develops a framework for the assessment of the separation of duties in an organization 
implementing the SAP R/3 enterprise resource planning system (ERP). R/3 assigns profiles consisting of 
authorizations to users. Accordingly, R/3 facilitates the implementation of “role-based access control”, 
where these profiles may be designed consistent with organizational roles and assigned to users 
performing these roles. This paper focuses on the separation of duties within the financial accounting (FI) 
module of SAP R/3. Separation of duties is viewed as a critical component of an organization’s internal 
control structure aimed primarily at reducing opportunities for fraudulent activities.
1.1 Threats to security 
Computerised information systems, whilst providing many benefits to organizations, are also vulnerable 
to many threats including traditional threats to paper-based accounting systems and threats due to the 
nature of computerised information systems. These threats can be internal or external intruders attempting 
to access sensitive information, modify data, make fraudulent changes to programs, enter fraudulent 
transactions and perform other undesirable acts within the system.
In order to threaten security in these ways, unauthorized users must penetrate the system or authorized 
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users must gain access to unauthorized functions or areas within the system. Various methods have been 
used to perform such unauthorized functions (Peterson and Turn, 1967, pp. 291-2; Reid, 1987, pp. 103-5; 
Stoll, 1988, pp. 488-9; Smaha, 1988, p. 40; Spafford, 1989; Seeley, 1989, pp. 700-3; Lunt, 1993). These 
methods include:
l     Passive techniques, including wiretapping, electromagnetic pickup, concealed transmitters, and 
electronic eavesdropping. These methods are used to discover information such as usernames, 
passwords, and message content. 
l     Attempted break-ins, or password guessing, which are used to gain access through an authorized 
user’s login. 
l     Masquerading, which occurs when an intruder “masquerades” as an authorized user. This can be 
achieved by several methods: logging in with the target user’s password and username; tapping 
into the line between the authorized user’s workstation and the central computer; or using an 
authorized user’s workstation that has been left logged on to the network. 
l     Browsing, which occurs when authorized users attempt to access unauthorized functions or 
sensitive data. 
l     Viruses and worms, which are programs that invade systems and are used to gain access to data, 
destroy or manipulate data and applications, or simply to use resources such as storage, memory, 
and processor time. 
This paper focuses on browsing techniques. Authorized users can be a threat if their activities are not 
restricted so as to prevent possible fraud or access to unauthorized areas in the system. Albrecht et al. 
(1984) conducted a study of firms that were victims of fraud. They concluded that three elements 
contribute to the probability of an employee defrauding an organization. These elements are situational 
pressures of the employee, opportunities to commit fraud, and either a low level of integrity or some way 
to rationalise the fraud. Of these three elements, the organization has control only over the level of 
opportunity to commit fraud within the organization.
Albrecht et al. (1984) examined organizational factors common to organizations that were victims of 
fraud. The most common factor identified was that too much trust was granted to certain employees. 
Other factors included the lack of: a proper procedure for authorisations; separation of transaction 
authorisation from custody of assets; and separation of accounting duties.
A common theme among these organizational factors is that there is typically a lack of proper separation 
of duties in organizations that suffer fraud. These results indicate that organizations are under significant 
threat even from authorized users if those users’ activities are not correctly restricted. The next section 
introduces the main countermeasures available to organizations to counter these threats to security.
1.2 Countermeasures 
In order to protect themselves from the threats to security outlined in the previous section, organizations 
may employ certain countermeasures. Best et al. (1997) identify four main categories:
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1.  Authentication. This countermeasure is aimed at restricting entry into the system. The methods 
available to ensure proper authentication of users include user names with passwords, challenge-
response systems, biometrics, and smart cards (Carroll, 1987, pp. 249-55; Pfleeger, 1989, pp. 233, 
453-4). 
2.  Access control. This countermeasure is designed to prevent unauthorized user activities through 
browsing. The purpose of access control is to restrict users’ access to data and functions within the 
system in order to prevent unauthorized use (Ferrailo et al., 1992). Ideally users should be 
restricted to data and functions that are required for them to fulfil their organizational role. This is 
generally referred to as “role-based access control”. 
3.  Cryptography. This countermeasure involves encoding data so that it will not be understandable if 
it is revealed through unauthorized access. This technique can be applied to data files, passwords, 
on line transactions, and other sensitive data (Davies and Price, 1989). 
4.  Audit trail analysis. This is a post hoc analysis of the records of user activity in the detailed system 
logs to detect failed attempts to perform unauthorized functions and to highlight unusual patterns 
of user behaviour, such as logins after hours. 
1.3 Separation of duties 
Ferrailo et al. (1992) noted that “although more of a policy than a mechanism, separation of related duties 
is used in deterring fraud within financial systems. Such duties can include authorising, approving and 
recording transactions, issuing or receiving assets, and making payments. Separation of related duties 
refers to the situation where different users are given distinct, but often interrelated tasks such that a 
failure of one user to perform as expected will be detected by another. For separation of related duties to 
be effective, computer capabilities must be partitioned. These capabilities must be accessible only to users 
or processes associated with specific tasks”.
Research into internal controls and external auditors’ judgments has indicated that the assessment of 
separation of duties is a dominating factor in an auditor’s evaluation of an internal control structure 
(Ashton, 1974; Ashton and Brown, 1980; Hamilton and Wright, 1982). Clark and Wilson (1987) 
examined commercial and military security models and found that separation of duties in performing 
transactions in commercial security models was an important aspect of maintaining data integrity. A 
simple model whereby a transaction could not be executed by one user, but must be broken up into two or 
more steps, was proposed. The authors noted that this model was overly simplistic but stated that “the 
separation of duty determination can be rather complex, because the decisions for all the transactions 
interact”.
Srinidhi (1994) performed a study of the importance of separation of duties as an internal control by 
means of a survey of auditors. The findings indicated that auditors place significantly lower reliance on 
internal control systems without adequate separation of duties. The functions identified as being 
incompatible were:
l     Assigning the responsibilities for both authorising and executing a transaction to the same person. 
l     The same person is responsible for defining the conditions for a transaction and checking whether 
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those conditions are satisfied. 
l     Combining the responsibilities for the authorisation of a transaction and the custody of the asset(s) 
involved in the transaction. 
l     Combining the responsibilities for authorising and accounting for a transaction. 
l     Combining the responsibilities for the accounting of a transaction and the custody of the asset(s) 
involved in the transaction. 
l     Accounting functions for two different transactions are assigned to the same person. 
Arens and Loebbecke (2000, pp. 295-6) prescribe four general guidelines for the separation of duties that 
are designed to prevent both fraud and error:
1.  Separation of the custody of assets from accounting. This prevents a person with custody of an 
asset from disposing of the asset and adjusting the records to conceal the action. 
2.  Separation of the authorization of transactions from the custody of related assets. The 
authorization of a transaction and the handling of the related asset by the same person increases the 
opportunity for fraud. 
3.  Separation of operational responsibility from record-keeping responsibility. If a division is 
responsible for preparing its own records and reports, there may be a tendency to bias the results to 
improve its reported performance. 
4.  Separation of information technology (IT) duties from duties of key users outside IT. Program 
modifications should be performed only by authorized IT personnel. Users outside IT should be 
responsible for authorizing transactions, on-line data entry, correction of errors in input, and 
review of output from the system. 
The extent to which duties may be separated depends on the size of the organization. Often, the apparent 
lack of adequate separation of duties in smaller organizations can be compensated for through the active 
involvement of the owner/manager.
In ERP environments with hundreds or even thousands of users accessing the system on-line, the only 
way to separate duties within the computer system is to assign authorizations and profiles to users which 
prevent them from performing incompatible functions. A set of principles extending beyond those above 
are required to govern the development and assignment of these access rights.
1.4 Separation of duties principles 
There is a significant amount of literature related to role-based access control and separation of duties 
(Kuhn, 1997; Moffett, 1988; Sandhu and Coyne, 1996; Bertino et al., 1997; Sandhu, 1998; Kuhn, 1997; 
Ahn and Sandhu (1999). This literature, however, does not progress any further toward a framework for 
separation of duties than that of Clark and Wilson (1987).
This paper proposes seven basic principles for the separation of duties within the general ledger (GL), 
accounts receivable (AR), and accounts payable (AP) applications:
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1.  Users who can create and modify master records should not be able to post transactions. Users 
who can maintain vendor master records and post transactions (invoices and payments) could 
create a fake vendor record and pay a fictitious invoice without detection. If these duties were 
separated, this fraud could only be accomplished with the collusion of two personnel. 
2.  Credit management should be separated from master record maintenance in accounts receivable. 
This is to avoid the master record clerk creating a fake customer master record and granting credit 
to it. 
3.  Dunning and credit management should be separated from invoice and receipt data entry. This is 
to provide an independent check on data entry and to preserve the independence of the officer in 
charge of credit. 
4.  Receipt data entry should be separated from invoice and credit memo data entry. This is to provide 
a check against lapping and other fraud and error. 
5.  In accounts payable, cheques should be managed and payments performed by someone other than 
the person who enters vendor invoices. This ensures that payments and invoices are an 
independent check on each other. For example, if an employee could enter both then he or she 
could post a fictitious invoice and then pay it. 
6.  Writing off an account receivable as a bad debt should be separated from receipt data entry. This 
is because a clerk could fail to record a receipt and write the account off as a bad debt to cover 
theft of cash. 
7.  Users’ activities should not cross boundaries between GL, AR, and AP. This separation is 
necessary so that the control accounts in GL can provide a check against AR and AP and so that 
offsetting transactions between AR and AP are properly authorized. 
These principles are summarised in Table I.
The next section gives a brief overview of SAP R/3 and its security system.
1.5 SAP R/3 
SAP R/3 is an ERP. It is comprised of a collection of modules including financial accounting, cost 
controlling, materials management, production planning and human resources. Of these modules, only the 
financial accounting (FI) module is required for R/3 to function. The other modules provide further 
capabilities for the system and are integrated with FI. This research is concerned only with the FI module 
and will focus on general ledger (GL), accounts receivable (AR), and accounts payable (AP).
The motivation for this study stems from the dominance of SAP R/3 in the international medium-to-large 
size organization market, the critical nature of separation of duties, and the lack of research into how to 
implement and assess this important internal control in R/3 environments.
The next section describes the way in which user authorizations are administered in the R/3 system.
Role-based access control in R/3 
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R/3 facilitates the implementation of role-based access control (RBAC). RBAC is a method of restricting 
users’ access to certain functions within the system. It is a “logical access” control. This means that the 
software itself restricts access, as compared with “physical access” controls such as a lock on the 
computer room door. RBAC applies the “principle of least privilege”, which means that users have to be 
“authorized” to perform a certain action rather than “restricted” from performing other actions (Pfleeger, 
1989, p. 246). Authorizations are associated with roles. Roles are assigned to users. These authorizations 
are necessary for users to be able to perform their duties. If a user’s authorization profile contains no 
authorizations then that user cannot perform any action on the system. Users should have sufficient 
authorizations to be able to perform their duties and no more than that. Reviewing separation of duties in 
an R/3 system requires an understanding of several concepts, namely authorization objects, 
authorizations, profiles, and transaction codes.
Authorization objects are defined in the R/3 documentation (SAP AG, 1997):
Authorization objects allow you to define complex authorizations. An authorization object groups 
together up to ten authorization fields in an AND relationship in order to check whether a user is allowed 
to perform a certain action. To pass an authorization test for an object, the user must satisfy the 
authorization check for each field in the object. 
Authorization objects are templates for authorizations. For example, one authorization object is 
“accounting document: authorization for company code”. This authorization object has two fields:
1.  A list of the company codes where documents can be processed. 
2.  A list of the activities permitted for document processing in the abovementioned company codes. 
Authorizations are defined in the R/3 documentation as (SAP AG, 1997):
Authority to perform a particular action in the R/3 System. Each authorization refers to one authorization 
object and defines one or more permissible values for each authorization field listed in the authorization 
object. Authorizations are combined in profiles which are entered in a user’s master record. 
An authorization usually consists of two fields (but may have up to ten fields). The first field is usually 
the domain which could be one or more company codes for example. The second field is usually the 
activity permitted in the domain. This could be create, change, display, etc. Authorizations are based on 
authorization objects.
Authorizations in R/3 are not assigned individually to users. Profiles, incorporating lists of authorizations, 
are created to represent user roles within the organization. These profiles are allocated to user master 
records and the users are then permitted to perform the functions authorized within that profile. Users may 
be allocated multiple profiles, if appropriate, and composite profiles which consist of two or more “simple 
profiles”.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/muller/Deskt...f%20duties%20in%20an%20SAP%20R-3%20environment.htm (7 of 20)26/10/2009 9:22:55 AM
Emerald FullText Article : A framework for separation of duties in an SAP R/3 environment
Each menu function in the R/3 system is assigned a transaction code. Transaction codes are linked to 
authorization objects. For a user to be authorized to perform a transaction code he/she must have 
authorizations in his/her profile(s) that are based on specific authorization objects. For example, to 
perform transaction code F-01 (posting document), users must have a valid authorization in their profile 
that is based on authorization object F_BKPF_BUK – Accounting Document: Authorization for company 
code. The authorization objects required for each transaction code are detailed in Table USOBT in SAP 
R/3.
1.6 Scope of this research 
This project involves the development of a separation of duties framework for the FI module of SAP R/3.
The framework consists of a set of organizational roles with allocated transaction codes and associated 
authorizations, developed from a set of separation of duties principles. Deviations from this framework by 
an organization may indicate a lack of proper separation of duties. A series of case studies are conducted 
to assess the appropriateness of this framework and to identify potential areas for refinement.
2 Framework development
The primary objective of this framework is to propose a set of organizational roles for GL, AR, and AP 
based on the separation of duties principles outlined in section 1. Transaction codes and associated 
authorizations are allocated to these roles. This framework will assist auditors responsible for assessing 
separation of duties in an ERP environment. Deviations from this framework by an organization may 
indicate a lack of proper separation of duties. As described in section 1, a breakdown in separation of 
duties increases an organization’s exposure to employee fraud and error. These roles provide a reference 
point for the assessment of the separation of duties in an organization’s R/3 FI profiles.
The following sections describe the design objectives of this framework in relation to general ledger, 
accounts receivable and accounts payable.
2.1 General ledger 
The specific objective within GL is to separate the entry and posting of GL transactions from the 
authorization to create, change and delete GL master records (principle G.1). In order to achieve this 
separation, two GL roles are proposed – GL supervisor and GL data entry. Master record maintenance is 
deemed to be the more senior duty, and is allocated to the GL supervisor. Transaction entry and posting 
are allocated to the GL data entry profile. The transaction codes associated with these two functions are 
illustrated by Table II.
A further profile is necessary to incorporate financial accounting transactions such as closing entries, 
accruals, tax returns, maintenance of bank master records, and archiving functions. This profile is titled 
“Accountant” and it is a senior profile which spans GL, AR and AP.
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2.2 Accounts receivable 
The following separation of duties principles were used to develop the proposed framework in AR:
l     Separation of master record maintenance from transaction entry. 
l     AR.1. Separation of credit management from master record maintenance. 
l     AR.2. Separation of dunning and credit management from invoice and receipt data entry. 
l     AR.3. Separation of receipt data entry from invoice and credit memo data entry. 
l     AR.4. Separation of bad debts management from receipt data entry. 
To achieve adequate separation of these duties, four AR profiles are proposed: AR supervisor, AR clerk 
(master record maintenance), AR data entry (invoice), and AR data entry (receipts). The accountant 
profile was allocated financial accounting duties within AR. The transaction codes associated with these 
four roles are shown in Table III.
2.3 Accounts payable 
The following two separation of duties principles were used to develop the proposed framework in AP:
1.  G.1. Separation of master record maintenance from transaction entry. 
2.  AP.1. Separation of payments and cheque maintenance from invoice data entry. 
To achieve adequate separation of these duties, three AP profiles are proposed: AP Supervisor, AP Clerk, 
and AP Data Entry. The transaction codes that are assigned to these roles are given in Table IV.
Allocating authorization objects and field values to roles 
Having identified the minimum number of different roles required to achieve separation of duties, it is 
now necessary to allocate the remaining transaction codes to the roles created. For example, transaction 
code “FD03 – AR master record – display” was given to all AR roles as well as the accountant role. This 
was based on the assumption that merely viewing a master record was not a critical function and that for 
convenience it should be allocated to all AR roles. In contrast, transaction code “F.64 – correspondence – 
maintain” was allocated to AP supervisor and not AP data entry, even though it is not a critical function. 
This distinction was made on the assumption that maintaining correspondence was not something that 
would be performed by a data entry employee.
To permit the assessment of authorizations given to the GL, AR and AP roles, the next stage in 
framework development was to identify the authorization objects and required field values for each 
transaction code in each role. This was achieved by analysis of the USOBT table which specifies the 
relationships between transaction codes and authorization objects. Using this table, a list of authorizations 
for each profile was generated.
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Once the list of authorizations was established for each profile, the next step was to examine whether the 
critical transaction codes were separated using these authorizations. A list of the critical transaction codes 
and their corresponding authorizations was reviewed for adequate separation of duties. Some problems 
were found – particularly with posting. For example, many of these transactions had the same 
authorization object – F_BKPF_BUK with the activity field value “1” (create). A profile that contained 
this authorization could perform any of the document posting transaction codes. A list of the critical 
transaction codes which only require this authorisation object and field value is given in Table V.
It follows that further restriction is required to achieve satisfactory separation of duties. One method to 
improve restriction is the use of the authorization object S_TCODE – Authorization Check for 
Transaction Start. This authorization object enables an administrator to specify what transaction codes 
may be executed by a profile. Use of authorizations based on this object could eliminate the problems 
outlined previously.
3 Case study analysis
This section describes the case studies that were performed in the course of this research. The objective of 
these case studies is to test the application of the theoretical framework and to further refine the 
framework. Three case studies were performed:
1.  This initial case study analysed SAP predefined profiles. The transaction codes for each profile in 
FI were available for analysis. 
2.  This case study involved an analysis of the security model of an actual company (Company A). 
This security model provided details of organizational roles and authorizations for each profile. As 
such, the FI roles and profiles were analysed. 
3.  This case study analysed the security model of another actual company (Company B). This 
security model provided details of transaction codes not authorizations. As such, only the design 
not the implementation of the security model is analysed in this case study. 
In each case study the methodology applied was to review the separation of duties using the framework 
developed and then to classify differences as either anomalies (i.e. problems with separation of duties in 
the case study) or as contributions to the framework. The sections following outline the findings for each 
of the case studies.
3.1 Case study 1 
Case study 1 examined the predefined profiles available from SAP that are relevant to GL, AR, and AP 
within the FI module. In this case study the authorizations were not available to be reviewed. Only the 
transaction codes were available. The roles available in GL, AR, and AP are displayed in Table VI.
The duties assigned to the roles in case study 1 are quite broad. These profiles differ from the theoretical 
framework developed in this research in several fundamental aspects. The profiles do not include a GL 
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supervisor – these responsibilities are given to the accounting manager. The supervisor profiles inherited 
all of the duties of the clerk profiles. Finally, the accounting manager and accounting clerk profiles 
include duties from GL, AR, and AP. These combinations of duties include several assignments of 
incompatible duties to the same role.
The lack of roles that maintain master records presents a problem. This duty is consequently assigned to 
either the supervisor or the data entry (clerk in this case) profiles. The other main problem with these 
profiles is that the supervisor “inherits” all of the duties of the lower profiles. For example, the AR 
supervisor can perform all of the functions of the AR clerk and the accounting manager can perform all of 
the duties of AR supervisor, AP supervisor, AR clerk, AP clerk, and GL clerk.
The lack of separation of duties in this case study can be demonstrated by a few examples:
l     AR and AP clerks can maintain master records and post transactions. Therefore, an AP clerk could 
change the payment details of an accounts payable to a bank account held by that employee and 
then post payments to that account payable to his or her own bank account. Alternatively, an AP 
clerk could create a fake vendor master record and post fabricated invoices to that vendor and have 
the system pay his or her bank account. 
l     The supervisor can maintain master records, post transactions, maintain credit (in AR), maintain 
cheques, and perform cheque reconciliations. There is no control over the activities of this user. He 
or she could defraud the organization in any of a number of ways. 
In summary, the profiles of case study 1 offer very limited separation of duties. This supports the 
statement by Haelst and Jansen (1997) that, “… usage of standard R/3 authorizations and profiles is not 
recommended as these are defined too broadly”.
3.2 Case study 2 
Case study 2 consisted of an analysis of Company A’s FI security model. This document contained details 
about the various organizational roles and the profiles that were created to fill those roles. The document 
gave details of the duties assigned to each role and the authorizations assigned to each profile.
3.2.1 Design of roles for case study 2 
The security model gives details of the duties to be authorized for each profile. The profiles or roles 
developed include GL supervisor, GL data entry, AP supervisor, AP clerk, AP data entry, AR supervisor, 
AR clerk, AR invoice entry, and AR receipt entry. These profiles are summarised in Table VII.
These roles differ minimally from the framework developed by this research in the duties to be authorized 
for each profile.
The design of these roles incorporated satisfactory separation of duties. In addition to the critical 
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separations of duties included in the framework, the security model of Company A included a separation 
of the entry and posting of AR and AP transactions. This is achieved through the use of the “park” and 
“post parked” transactions. In Company A’s security model the data entry profile can park transactions 
such as invoices and credit memos, and the supervisor can post the parked transactions. This mechanism 
provides a separation of the entry from the authorization of transactions and may be included in the 
framework as an optional separation. If an organization separated invoice and credit memo data entry 
from posting using this method, separation of invoice and credit memo data entry is unnecessary.
The documentation provided by Company A for case study 2 includes both the design of the roles, and the 
authorizations that will be assigned to the profiles for these roles.
3.2.2 Authorizations for case study 2 
This section analyses the authorizations assigned to each profile by Company A to assess the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the security model.
Problems were apparent with the authorizations granted to the FI profiles for Company A. These 
problems include: no S_TCODE authorizations, use of “*” in ACTVT (activity) fields, and the use of “*” 
in KOART (account type) fields.
Authorizations based on the S_TCODE Authorization Check for Transaction Start authorization object 
are necessary to achieve adequate separation of duties. The transaction codes executable by a profile 
should be specified using the S_TCODE authorization object as well as the authorization objects that are 
linked to the critical transaction codes through the USOBT table. The implication of Company A not 
using the S_TCODE authorization object is that there is no separation of duties between AR invoice entry 
and AR receipt entry. It appears that Company A has attempted to overcome this inadequacy by using the 
authorization object F_BKPF_BLA Accounting Document: Authorization for Document Types to specify 
different authorization groups for the data entry profiles. This is not an adequate solution however, as 
F_BKPF_BLA is not linked to any of the data entry transactions through the USOBT table. The result is 
that authorizations based on this authorization object will not be checked for the critical data entry 
transactions (invoices, credit memos, receipts, etc.).
Company A has used “*” in its activity fields. In R/3 a “*” is interpreted as being any value. Use of “*” in 
authorizations could potentially grant more authorization to users than is intended. Company A has used 
“*” in its account type fields as well as its activity fields. This reduces the separation of duties between 
GL, AR, and AP. The account type fields should contain a “k” for accounts payable, an “s” for general 
ledger, or a “d” for accounts receivable.
3.3 Case study 3 
Case study 3 involved an analysis of Company B’s transaction codes that were assigned to the various 
organizational roles. The authorizations used to implement these profiles were not available for analysis.
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The roles that were deemed to be relevant to this research and the critical duties allowed for each are 
summarised within Table VIII.
The allocation of responsibilities in GL and AP in Company B corresponds with the proposed theoretical 
framework for separation of duties. The allocation of responsibilities in AR, however, results in a 
breakdown of separation of duties in this area.
Anomalies are apparent only in AR. One major cause of these anomalies is that there is not a specific role 
for customer master record maintenance as there is for vendor master record maintenance in AP.
The AR clerk should not be permitted to maintain customer master records as well as posting invoices and 
credit memos. The ability to perform both of these functions increases the opportunities for an employee 
to defraud the organization. The AR clerk would also not normally be permitted to maintain customer 
credit and post invoices. The ability to post invoices and maintain credit results in a loss of the 
independence of the “credit manager”.
The AR supervisor should not be permitted to post invoices and maintain credit for the same reason as for 
the AR clerk. For the same reasons, the AR supervisor should not be permitted to post invoices and 
maintain master records.
Finally, the cashier should not be permitted to post AR credit memos as well as record AR receipts. This 
is critical as a credit memo could be substituted for a receipt in order to cover a theft of cash.
Although not specifically an anomaly, care should be taken with some of the transaction codes assigned in 
these roles. Transaction codes such as F.80 – Mass Reversal of Documents, FB01 – Post Document, FB02 
– Change Document, and FB08 – Reverse Document are powerful transaction codes and care should be 
taken to ensure proper authorizations are in place to restrict the use of these transaction codes.
4 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a framework for the separation of duties within the GL, AR, and AP functions of 
the FI module of the SAP R/3 system. The development of this framework involved understanding the 
role of access controls, examining the SAP R/3 access control mechanism, developing principles for the 
separation of duties, and the development of a theoretical framework.
Analyses of three case studies provides support for the appropriateness of the framework. Both Company 
A and Company B had attempted to implement separation of duties using principles similar to those 
developed in this paper. The deficiencies in the SAP predefined profiles are well known and this was 
confirmed by the analysis in case study 1. Opportunities to refine the proposed framework were identified 
based on the results of case study 2.
Two limitations of this research must be acknowledged. It is recognized that decisions about the internal 
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controls to be implemented within an organization should be based on an appropriate risk analysis. 
Discussion of the relative costs of controls such as separation of duties was deemed to be beyond the 
scope of this study. Second, the framework developed was based on theory and refined using case studies. 
The limitation of case study research is that the results can provide support only for theoretical 
propositions and are not generalisable to populations (Yin, 1989). Rigorous empirical testing has not been 
performed on this framework.
This paper presents opportunities for several new avenues of research that would be beneficial. The 
theoretical framework could be extended to the other modules and the other functions within R/3. This 
would provide a complete picture of the duties and roles within R/3 as well as providing guidance for 
appropriate separation of duties within FI as a whole. A complete framework would be of great value for 
management and internal auditors, external auditors, and SAP implementation partners.
A decision support application could be developed to automate the arduous task of checking the 
authorizations within profiles to assess adherence with the theoretical framework. This application could 
be designed using software such as Microsoft Access whereby the SAP tables could be downloaded and 
tested using a Visual Basic application. Development of an application of this type would improve the 
analysis of an organization’s separation of duties by eliminating human error and improving efficiency.
The case study research performed in the course of this research has identified problems with separation 
of duties in both of the organizations examined as well as identifying separation of duties problems in the 
SAP predefined roles. Although the empirical studies undertaken are not generalisable to the population, 
they do identify the need for further research on the adequacy of separation of duties in the population of 
organizations using SAP R/3 and the consequential implications.
Finally, the theoretical framework could be assessed through a survey of experts (CIS auditors and SAP 
security administrators). Consensus on the adequacy of this framework could be assessed and useful 
feedback on cost-benefit issues could be gathered.
ImagePrinciples for the separation of duties
  
Table I Principles for the separation of duties 
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ImageGL critical transaction codes
  
Table II GL critical transaction codes 
ImageCritical AR transaction codes
  
Table III Critical AR transaction codes 
ImageCritical AP transaction codes
  
Table IV Critical AP transaction codes 
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ImageTransaction codes requiring authorization object F_BKPF_BUK
  
Table V Transaction codes requiring authorization object F_BKPF_BUK 
ImageCase study 1: roles and duties
  
Table VI Case study 1: roles and duties 
ImageCase study 2: roles and duties
  
Table VII Case study 2: roles and duties 
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ImageCase study 3: roles and duties
  
Table VIII Case study 3: roles and duties 
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